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the impact of what had become an unpopular and inappropriate legal regime
of matrimonial property. That the default regime, which affected the majority of
ordinary married couples, remained in place for so long was, to some extent, due to
the ability of the rich and the propertied to contract out of it. There is a similar risk of
bias in recent developments that, “[b]y concentrating our analysis on the ‘big money’
cases we are masking what actually happens in everyday practice”.32 Individual
modification of the rules of matrimonial property will always be appropriate for
some, and all couples should certainly be encouraged to consider and provide for the
economic, and not simply the romantic, implications of marriage but, if the demand
to opt-out continues to grow, it may be time to revisit the underlying rules.
Jane Mair
University of Glasgow
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Progress Towards Principles on the Breakdown of
Cohabitation: Selkirk v Chisholm
In Selkirk v Chisholm,1 Sheriff Hammond considers the body of reported
jurisprudence to date on section 28 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, which
allows for financial provision on the breakdown of cohabitation.2 “The decided cases
are instructive as examples of the application of the section 28 considerations,”
he advises. “However the cases do not as yet reveal any authoritative underlying
principles of general application in interpreting the provisions.”3 With this case the
sheriff has taken clear steps towards remedying this uncertainty. The question of
whether the underlying principles he extrapolates are correct within the scheme of
the legislation remains, however, in doubt.
32 E Hitchings, “The impact of recent ancillary relief jurisprudence in the ‘everyday’ ancillary relief case”
(2010) 22 CFLQ 93. For a comment on the significance, or otherwise, of this decision, see C Barton,
“ ‘In Stoke-On-Trent, my Lord, they speak of little else’: Radmacher v Granatino” [2011] Fam Law 67.
1 Duns Sheriff Court, 25 Nov 2010. The decision is available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.
uk/opinions/A15_08.html.
2 There have been five substantive decision to date on section 28, aside from the instant case: Jamieson v
Rodhouse 2009 Fam LR 34; CM v STS 2008 SLT 871; F v D 2009 Fam LR 11; Gow v Grant 2010
Fam LR 21 and Lindsay v Murphy 2010 Fam LR 156. Cameron v Leal 2010 SLT (Sh Ct) 164 is also of
assistance.
3 Para 100.
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A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Selkirk offered perhaps the clearest opportunity so far for clarification of the rationale
on which a financial award under section 28 should be based. The case appears
to have been well presented, avoiding the lack of detail in the financial aspects
of the pleadings which blighted many of the earlier decisions. More significantly,
the factual circumstances giving rise to the claim, at least on the basis of the
sheriff’s findings, were relatively straightforward. In October 1998, Leanna Selkirk
and Robert Chisholm became engaged to be married.4 They viewed a house in
Eyemouth together, which was subsequently purchased in the defender’s sole name.5
The parties cohabited there from April 1999 for roughly nine years.6 Both parties
worked throughout the huge majority of this period, the pursuer in various retail
service positions, the defender initially as a panel beater employed by a local company,
later becoming self-employed with his own business as a “bodyshop”.7 The financial
arrangements during the cohabitation were disputed, and although the sheriff
considered the pursuer to be “naive in financial matters”8 and the defender to have
“parsimonious attitudes”,9 the evidence of the defender was generally preferred.10 It
was accordingly found that the defender paid the mortgage and all household bills,11
with the pursuer contributing only to the cost of food and particularly expensive
phone calls.12 The parties maintained separate bank accounts13 and had no children.14
Section 28 allows for a financial award where the defender has derived economic
advantage from the contributions of the pursuer. Economic advantage to the defender
was held to exist, in the form of both increased capital and increased earning capacity.
Capital had accrued firstly in respect of the house. At the time of purchase, the house
was valued at £43,999 and contained equity of only £2,000.15 At the termination of
cohabitation, the house was worth £97,500 and contained equity of £25,942.16 The
increase in the value of the house was attributed solely to market forces.17 Capital
had also accrued in respect of the bodyshop business the defender had set up in
2005, which was funded partially through a loan secured on a remortgage of the
house.18 The capital in the business at the date cohabitation ceased was £45,366.19
The parties agreed that a figure of £20,693, representing money which the defender
4 Finding in fact 1.
5 Findings in fact 2-4.
6 Finding in fact 4.
7 Findings in fact 9-15.
8 Para 109.
9 Para 110.
10 Para 107.
11 Finding in fact 28.
12 Findings in fact 28 and 29.
13 Finding in fact 27.
14 Finding in fact 4.
15 Finding in fact 2.
16 Finding in fact 8.
17 Finding in fact 8.
18 Findings in fact 7 and 13.
19 Finding in fact 19.
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had himself inherited and invested in the business, should be discounted from this
figure.20 The net capital gain across the two assets was therefore £48,615.21 It was
also accepted by the sheriff that, although the defender’s income had not increased
during the cohabitation, the upward trend in the net profits of the defender’s business
since its creation formed the basis for a finding of increased earning capacity, albeit
that uncertainty remained over how this was to be quantified.22
B. LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION
Advantage having been established, could the next part of the test be satisfied: namely,
had this advantage derived from the contributions of the pursuer? This question
lies at the root of the uncertainty over section 28. The legislation does not make
explicit the nature of the connection to be established between contributions by one
party and advantage to the other. What is the underlying redistributive rationale?
Several potential answers have been hinted at it in the case law. In CM v STS,23 the
sole Court of Session decision so far, Lord Matthews took the view that cohabitants
were engaged in a joint endeavour during their relationship, with the result that any
benefits or losses obtained by either should be shared equally as part of the “burden of
cohabitation”.24 This approach essentially mirrors the scheme for financial provision
on divorce.25 The decision was subsequently criticised in the academic literature26
and has not been followed in any of the later cases. An alternative was suggested
in Gow v Grant,27 where Sheriff Mackie suggested that a payment made under
s28 should be “more in the nature of compensation”,28 and quantified the claim
with a view to placing the pursuer in the position she would have been in but for
the cohabitation. In the instant case, notwithstanding his desire to “adopt the clear
analysis of the relevant provisions by Sheriff Mackie in Gow v Grant”,29 Sheriff
Hammond does not follow this approach, albeit that the eventual outcome would
likely have been similar had he chosen to do so.
The findings in Selkirk v Chisholm suggest, in fact, that quantification of an award
under s28 should be rooted in the law of unjust enrichment. This approach does not
allow for legal title in respect of relevant assets to be disturbed at the cessation of
cohabitation, but examines rather the exact contributions that each party has “paid
in” to the relationship with a view to ensuring they are “paid out” the same amount
at the relationship’s conclusion. Changes brought about by external factors, such
20 Finding in fact 20 and para 59.
21 This figure differs slightly from the total given in the pursuer’s submissions as her calculations were
based on the lower figure of £25,307 in respect of equity in the house. The figure eventually agreed by
the parties, £25,942, is used in this article.
22 Para 114.
23 2008 SLT 871.
24 Para 290.
25 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 ss8-10.
26 J Thomson, “Palimony – Scottish style” (2008) 76 SLG 95.
27 2010 Fam LR 21.
28 Para 42.
29 Selkirk v Chisholm at para 99.
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as an increase in the value of the family home as a result of a rising market, are
not relevant.30
Although Sheriff Hammond does not refer explicitly to the rationale of his
decision, his findings fit neatly with the restitutionary approach outlined. The
increased equity in the home was found to be in no part derived from the pursuer’s
contributions. She had not contributed to the deposit put down on the house, or
to repayments of the mortgage debt.31 Furthermore, the sheriff agreed with the
defender’s counsel that, even had it been established the pursuer paid a half share
of the mortgage throughout, the appropriate measure of the economic advantage
to the defender would be not half of the increased equity, but merely a one half
share in the reduction of the debt, calculated as a figure of £4,982.32 The increased
equity arose purely from market forces, and was not derived from either party. Had
payment of domestic bills been shared between the parties, this would have had no
relevance to the issue of increased equity: bills would have to have been paid by both
parties regardless of whether they were together or not.33 The pursuer’s non-financial
contributions to the household in terms of work in the home, which the sheriff
accepted were probably greater than the defender’s non-financial contributions, were
also not found to have any connection to the increase in equity.34 The argument made
by the pursuer along the lines of Lord Matthews’ approach in CM v STS35 – that
had the house been held in joint names, she would have shared in the increased
equity, meaning she had suffered economic disadvantage as a result of the defender’s
sole title36 –was rejected as irrelevant.37 Since the pursuer had made neither direct
contributions to the defender’s business, nor contributed to the increased equity in
the home, she had no claim in respect of the capital value of the business, or to
the defender’s increased earning capacity. Overall, the pursuer was essentially seen
to have received as much from the relationship as she had paid into it, and so no
award was justified. The fact the defender was emerging from the relationship with
substantially more than he had paid into it was a matter of his own good fortune,
rather than an imbalance to be rectified in the pursuer’s interests.38
C. ANALYSIS
Lord Matthews’ approach in CM v STS39 is arguably now discredited. The last
two reported decisions on section 2840 have positioned themselves squarely on
30 For further discussion of this form of redistributive rationale, see G Douglas, J Pearce and
H Woodward, “Cohabitants, property and the law: a study of injustice” (2009) 72 MLR 24 at 29-30.
31 Para 116.
32 Para 118.
33 Para 117.
34 Para 120.
35 2008 SLT 871
36 Selkirk v Chisholm at para 73.
37 Para 124.
38 Para 126.
39 2008 SLT 871
40 In addition to the instant case, see Lindsay v Murphy 2010 Fam LR 156.
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restitutionary principles. Are we seeing the emergence of a judicial consensus on
the redistributive rationale underlying these provisions? Clarity in interpretation is,
of course, to be welcomed in any area of legislation, and most especially an area such
as this which may affect how individuals order their private relationships. It should
not be forgotten, however, that one of the parliamentary objectives outlined for this
legislation was to protect economically vulnerable parties emerging from a cohabiting
relationship.41 Ms Selkirk may not have been in this unfortunate position, but it is
easy to envisage a slightly different scenario where economic hardship would almost
certainly follow. For example, imagine the parties had had a child, and the pursuer
had given up employment to care full time for the baby. As here, she would not
have been contributing financially to the household. Her non-financial contributions,
following the decision here, would not be held to have any connection to the increase
in the equity of the house. At the cessation of cohabitation, she would presumably
be entitled to some payment in respect of the economic burden of post-relationship
childcare costs under section 28(2)(b), but beyond that, she would have nothing. One
might answer that the pursuer ought to have ensured that the house was held in
joint names, but this renders the position no different to what it had been prior to
the introduction of the 2006 Act. If the hypothetical Ms Selkirk with child is not the
economically vulnerable party this legislation was designed to protect, who is?
Selkirk v Chisholm is, in itself, a well-reasoned decision resulting in an outcome
which many may consider fair. If the restitutionary rationale adopted in the case is
correct, however, it is ultimately unclear whether this legislation can ever achieve the
purpose for which it was introduced.
Frankie McCarthy
University of Glasgow
41 See the Policy Memorandum accompanying the Family Law (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 36-PM) at paras
64-66 and 77.
